D.C. Circuit
Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F.Supp.2d 43, 57-59 (D.D.C. 2013) (concluding that “a reasonable officer would have known that a cross-gender search of a female detainee by male USMS employees that included intimate physical contact, exposure of private body parts, and verbal harassment, all in front of male detainees and male USMS employees in the absence of an emergency, was unreasonable”).
Brown v. Short, 729 F.Supp.2d 125, 141 (D.D.C. 2010) (stating that “the law was clearly established that strip searches of arrestees charged with minor offenses would, absent individualized suspicion, be held unreasonable under Bell even where the arrestee was to be intermingled with the general prison population and especially where the official conducting the search did not take reasonable efforts to protect the privacy of the party being searched”).
First Circuit
Baggett v. Ashe, 41 F. Supp. 3d 113 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2014) (“Ultimately, a reasonable individual in Defendants’ position could not have concluded that permitting male officers to videotape female inmates during strip searches — even if the officers looked away — was constitutional.”).
Second Circuit
Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that “in the absence of indicia that this Court has found to support individualized reasonable suspicion in the past, a reasonable jury might determine that Defendants were acting in a fashion that clearly violated Hartline’s Fourth Amendment rights”).
Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “it was clearly established in 1995 that persons charged with a misdemeanor and remanded to a local correctional facility like NCCC have a right to be free of a strip search absent reasonable suspicion that they are carrying contraband or weapons”).
Eighth Circuit
Robinson v. Hawkins, 937 F.3d 1128, 1137-38 (8th Cir. 2019) (stating that “clearly established law holds that strip searches are to be conducted by an officer of the same sex as the suspect ‘in an area as removed from public view as possible without compromising legitimate security concerns’ and to ‘be performed in a hygienic fashion and not in a degrading, humiliating or abusive fashion’”).
Benson v. Piper, 17-CV-266 (DWF/TNL), 2019 WL 2017319, at *18 (D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, CV 17-266 (DWF/TNL), 2019 WL 1307883 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2019) (“Under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff has a clearly established right to be free from unclothed visual body searches conducted in an abusive manner.”).
Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F. Supp. 2d 961, 971 (D. Minn. 2005) (stating that “plaintiff has identified a written jail policy that, on its face, appears to authorize strip searches of all gross misdemeanant arrestees (such as plaintiff), with no requirement of a reasonable suspicion”).
Starks v. City of Minneapolis, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1088 (D. Minn. 1998) (“The Court holds that a reasonable police officer would not be justified in assuming an on-street strip search was within the constitutional boundaries defined by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, or Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the State of Minnesota.”).
Marriott By and Through Marriott v. Smith, 931 F.2d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 1991) (“While officers are certainly not required to anticipate new developments in the law, in this case the law has not changed, and is not changed by this opinion. Defendants simply rely on a grievous misreading of existing case law. Nothing in the Hunter or Smothers cases suggests that prison visitors’ fourth amendment rights not to be searched without a warrant are abridged after their visit and after the danger of smuggling has passed.”).
Smothers v. Gibson, 778 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir. 1985) (“While prison officials have the right to conduct reasonable searches of prison visitors, with far greater latitude than in other settings, the right to indiscriminately strip search anyone who enters is not and cannot be authorized. Their alleged reliance on an informant’s tip as justification was equally unreasonable on the facts here. An anonymous tip requires some measure of corroboration to warrant official action. . . . Before a tip can justify a search, ‘the nature of the tip, the reliability of the informant, the degree of corroboration, other factors contributing to suspicion or the lack thereof, and the nature and extent of the search must all be assessed.’”).
Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 n.4 (8th Cir. 1985) (“We hold that the fourth amendment’s protection against the kind of search of which Jones complains was well-established at the time his search took place. Aside from the wording of the fourth amendment itself and the many decisions of the Supreme Court limiting the authority of officials to search suspects, the Seventh Circuit had already affirmed a district court’s disapproval of a strip search of a motorist unsuspected of harboring weapons or contraband.”).
John Does 1-100 v. Boyd, 613 F. Supp. 1514, 1524 (D. Minn. 1985) (“While the need to ensure jail security is a legitimate interest, the strip searches of lesser offenders as a matter of policy bears such an insubstantial relationship to security needs that, when balanced against the severe intrusion on plaintiffs’ privacy rights, the searches are not ‘reasonable.’”).