entry into home, garage, or curtilage

D.C. Circuit

Corrigan v. District of Columbia, 841 F.3d 1022, 1034-38 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Clearly established law foreclosed the broad and invasive search that was executed. And even assuming, without deciding, that the community caretaking doctrine could justify the warrantless search of a home, it cannot shield the officers from liability. It is clearly established that this doctrine encompasses only police searches that are occasioned by, and strictly circumscribed by, the need to perform caretaking functions ‘totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence related to’ a crime.”).

First Circuit

Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 634-36 (1st Cir. 2015) (stating that “a reasonable officer standing in O’Neill’s shoes should have known that her warrantless entry was not within the compass of the community caretaking exception and, thus, that her intrusion into the plaintiff’s home abridged his constitutional rights”).

DeMayo v. Nugent, 517 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that “Kirk and Payton provided Nugent and Lugas with sufficient notice that their entry into DeMayo’s home was in violation of clearly established law”).

Second Circuit

Harris v. O’Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 241 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Because the police officers lacked a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances to invade Plaintiffs’ curtilage, and because Defendants cannot offer any other basis on which the officers’ intrusion would be lawful, we conclude that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.”).

Eighth Circuit

Luer v. Clinton, 18-3512, 2021 WL 560821, at *5-6 (8th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021) (stating that “it is clearly established that ‘[s]omething more than a speculative hunch is needed for police to conduct a protective sweep,’” and that “it was clearly established by controlling Fourth Amendment precedents that the officers’ full blown search of the entire Luer-Steinebach domicile without a warrant was objectively unreasonable”).

Mikkalson v. City of S. St. Paul, 14-4208 (JRT/JSM), 2016 WL 4186935, at *11 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2016) (“The essential question is thus whether it was clearly established that Greengo could not enter the garage – a space in which Mikkalson had a protected Fourth Amendment interest – absent a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. The Court answers this question in the affirmative – the right was clearly established.”).

Rosen v. Wentworth, CIV. 12-1188 ADM/FLN, 2013 WL 5567447, at *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2013) (“In this case, having construed the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable official should have known that directly proceeding to Plaintiffs’ backyard in the middle of the night, entering their back porch without announcement, and examining and removing contents found therein violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.”).

Hemphill v. Hale, 677 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 2012) (“The law regarding forced consent was clearly established in August 2009 such that a reasonable person in Hale’s position would have known that his actions were unreasonable.”).

Arias v. U.S. Immig. and Cust. Enf’t Div. of the Dept. of Homeland Sec., CIV 07-1959 ADM/JSM, 2009 WL 2171037, at *4 (D. Minn. July 17, 2009) (“For purposes of qualified immunity, it is clearly established that officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they enter a home without a warrant absent consent or exigent circumstances.”).

Doe v. LaDue, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1138 (D. Minn. 2007) (stating that “the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is a well-established right, even for predatory offender registrants,” and that “Owatonna adopted and enforced a policy that was constitutionally infirm”).

Dawkins v. Graham, 50 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1995) (“This case involves the fundamental and long-established Fourth Amendment rights to retreat into one’s own home and to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion there.  . . .  The more specific right not to be subjected to the unreasonable mistaken execution of a valid search warrant was also clearly established at the time of the search in this case.”).