Third Circuit
Lockhoff v. Slonaker, CV 16-2893, 2017 WL 2423790, at *11 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2017) (“Where an individual suspected of a nonviolent offense, who has been frisked for weapons and placed in handcuffs, is in the custody of two officers and is physically compliant, there is simply no governmental interest that would justify the continued post-restraint use of force at issue here.”).
Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 497 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that post-handcuffing application of mace and kneeling on the back of a 14-year-old was clearly unconstitutional under Graham factors).
Fourth Circuit
Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 745 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Thus, Kennedy and Whitley violated clearly established law in using force to seize Michael when he had committed no crime and when they had no reason to believe he was a danger to himself or others. It was especially clear that they were not entitled to use force after Michael was secured face down on the floor in handcuffs and leg restraints.”).
Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 534 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that “it was clearly established that a police officer was not entitled to use unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force against a handcuffed, secured citizen, who posed no threat to the officer or others and had neither committed, nor was suspected of committing, any crime”).
Sixth Circuit
Pershell v. Cook, 430 F. App’x 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2011) (“It was . . . clearly established at the time of the incident that striking a handcuffed and immobilized arrestee is unreasonable conduct.”).
Alkhateeb v. Charter Twp. of Waterford, 190 Fed. Appx. 443, 453 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Officers are and have been on notice that the use of gratuitous force against a detained and passive or non-resisting suspect violates the Constitution. No reasonable officer would have believed that he could kick, kneel upon a suspect’s neck, or hold a gun to a suspect’s head when that suspect has shown no sign of resistance, no sign of being armed or dangerous, and is already subdued.”).
Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681, 688 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that “Sixth Circuit case law supports Shreve’s right not to be struck and jumped on gratuitously”).
Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that “there was simply no governmental interest in continuing to beat Phelps after he had been neutralized, nor could a reasonable officer have thought there was”).
McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1307 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that “a totally gratuitous blow with a policeman’s nightstick may cross the constitutional line”).
Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The unprovoked and unnecessary striking of a handcuffed citizen in the mouth with a nightstick is clearly excessive.”).
Seventh Circuit
Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673, 687 (7th Cir. 2007) (“No reasonable officer could have thought that it was . . . proper to continually grind his knee into the face of an unresisting arrestee.”).
Eighth Circuit
Burnikel v. Fong, 886 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir. 2018) (“It was . . . clearly established in 2013 ‘that when a person is subdued and restrained with handcuffs, a ‘gratuitous and completely unnecessary act of violence’ is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment.’”).
White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1080 (8th Cir. 2017) (stating that “it ‘was clearly established that the use of this type of gratuitous force against a suspect who is handcuffed, not resisting, and fully subdued is objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment’”).
Blazek v. City of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2014) (“It was clearly established in 2009 that when a person is subdued and restrained with handcuffs, a ‘gratuitous and completely unnecessary act of violence’ is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment.”).
Montoya v. City of Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867, 872 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that “the contours of the right at issue were sufficiently clear to inform a reasonable officer in Officer Hooper’s position it was unlawful for him to perform a ‘leg sweep’ and throw to the ground a nonviolent, suspected misdemeanant who was not threatening anyone, was not actively resisting arrest, and was not attempting to flee”).
Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 805 F. Supp. 2d 712, 722 (D. Minn. 2011) (stating that “Anderson had a clearly established right to be free from injury once in custody”).
Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 908 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The gratuitous use of force alleged by Chambers was not reasonable under the circumstances.”).
Maeberry v. City of St. Paul, Minn., CIV 09-1216, 2010 WL 2814285, at *6 (D. Minn. July 16, 2010) (“The gratuitous use of ASR on a restrained suspect is excessive force.”).
Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 566 (8th Cir. 2009) (“It was clearly established that the use of this type of gratuitous force against a suspect who is handcuffed, not resisting, and fully subdued is objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).
Pena v. City of Worthington, CIV. 07-1578 JRT/FLN, 2008 WL 3262420, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2008) (“Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Leon as the Court must in assessing this motion, the record shows that Sergeant Gaul forcefully shoved a compliant, non-resistant suspect into a door jam, well after he had been handcuffed and with sufficient force to cause a partial dislocation of the suspect’s shoulder. The Court finds that a reasonable officer would be on notice that the use of such force in these circumstances would violate the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.”).
Meir v. McCormick, CIV.06 190 ADM/JSM, 2007 WL 1725701, at *7 (D. Minn. June 15, 2007) (“While none of the preceding cases is factually identical to the instant case, together they establish that a reasonable officer would understand that it is not objectively reasonable to take an individual face first to the ground when the individual is handcuffed, not resisting arrest, and under control.”).
Ross v. Buck, 186 Fed. Appx. 697, 699 (8th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“Because a reasonable jury could conclude that Jess’s use of the pepper foam and other conduct was gratuitous and therefore unreasonable, . . . and because the unreasonableness of the alleged conduct was clearly established at the time of the incident, Ross is entitled to proceed on these claims against Officer Jess.”).
Madison v. City of Minneapolis, CIV.02-4257(JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 1630953, at *7 (D. Minn. July 15, 2004) (stating that “the Court finds it clearly established in this circuit that an incapacitated, no longer dangerous suspect has a right to be free from further violent actions”).
Cornelious v. Brubaker, 01CV1254(MGD/JGL), 2003 WL 21511125, at *11 (D. Minn. June 25, 2003) (stating that “once the arrestee has been subdued, there would be no reason for the officer to continue to beat upon the offender”).
Daniels v. Downing, CIV. 01-1673(JEL/JGL, 2003 WL 252114, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2003) (“Given that Daniels had obeyed all of Downing’s orders, had kneeled on the sidewalk with her hands raised for approximately ten minutes, and was at least three car lengths away from the gun, no reasonable officer would believe that the law permitted him to approach Daniels from behind, and, without warning, slam her face into the sidewalk and knee her in the back.”).
Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that “accepting Mayard’s account of her treatment by Officer Meyer while being transported to police headquarters, the force allegedly used against Mayard by Officer Meyer while she was handcuffed and hobbled in the rear of the squad car was not objectively reasonable”).
Tenth Circuit
McCowan v. Morales, 945 F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2019) (stating that it was clear to a reasonable officer in defendant’s position “that applying gratuitous force to a restrained and compliant misdemeanant suspect violated the Fourth Amendment”).
Perea v. Baca, 817 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that it was clearly established that “officers may not continue to use force against a suspect who is effectively subdued”).
Eleventh Circuit
Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We hold that a handcuffed, non-resisting defendant’s right to be free from excessive force was clearly established in February 2002.”).