Fourth Circuit
Turmon v. Jordan, 405 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that “it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that he could not point his gun at an individual’s face, jerk him from his room, and handcuff him when there was no reasonable suspicion that any crime had been committed, no indication that the individual posed a threat to the officer, and no indication that the individual was attempting to resist or evade detention”).
Sixth Circuit
Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 954 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Vann’s use of force occurred after he saw that Barton was unarmed, non-threatening, and compliant. We conclude that no reasonable officer would find that the circumstances surrounding the arrest of Barton required the level of force used here.”).
Seventh Circuit
Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that “it was clearly established that ‘police officers do not have the right to shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens without any provocation whatsoever'”).
Eighth Circuit
McReynolds v. Schmidli, 4 F.4th 648, 655 (8th Cir. 2021) (stating that “it was clearly established at the time of the incident that the level of force Schmidli asserted against McReynolds, who was not resisting, was not a threat, and was not a flight risk, was unreasonable and in violation of McReynolds’ constitutional rights”).
Brittni A. Gaines, Pl., v. City of Minneapolis, and Officer Nathan Bauer, Defendants., CV 18-838 (PAM/HB), 2019 WL 7283992, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 2019) (stating that there are “many cases establishing that a ‘reasonable officer would have understood that he could not forcefully take down [Gaines]—a nonviolent, nonthreatening misdemeanant who was not actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee—in the allegedly violent and uncontrolled manner that [Bauer] did’”).
Jackson v. Stair, 944 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2019) (stating that “there was sufficient case law to establish that a misdemeanor suspect in Jackson’s position at the time of the second tasing – non-threatening, non-fleeing, non-resisting – had a clearly established right to be free from excessive force”).
Johnson v. Courtois, 17-CV-3608 (ECT/DTS), 2018 WL 6726892, at *12 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 2018) (citing Eighth Circuit holdings that “where none of the three Graham factors suggest that an officer’s use of force was reasonable, the use of such force violates clearly established Fourth Amendment rights,” and that “a reasonable officer would understand that, if a nonviolent, nonthreatening misdemeanant was not resisting arrest but simply ‘did not have time to comply’ with an officer’s order, the use of a ‘significant force’ against her would violate her clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment to be free of excessive force”).
Karels v. Storz, 906 F.3d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating that “several cases establish that every reasonable officer would have understood that he could not forcefully take down Karels—a nonviolent, nonthreatening misdemeanant who was not actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee—in the allegedly violent and uncontrolled manner that Storz did”).
Wilson v. Lamp, 901 F.3d 981, 990 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing seven cases for the proposition that “an officer’s ‘use of force against a suspect who was not threatening and not resisting’ is unreasonable”).
Rokusek v. Jansen, 899 F.3d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating that “several cases establish that every reasonable official would have understood that he could not throw Rokusek—a nonviolent, nonthreatening misdemeanant who was not actively resisting—face-first to the ground”).
Michael v. Trevena, 899 F.3d 528, 533 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Under Michael’s version of the facts, he was a nonviolent misdemeanant who neither fled nor actively resisted arrest, and posed no threat to the officers or other members of the public. . . . Under these circumstances, it is objectively unreasonable to make an arrest by grabbing the suspect by the throat (Trevena), or using a baton with sufficient force to break the suspect’s arm (Chaffee).”).
Burnikel v. Fong, 886 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating that “it was clearly established in 2013 that it was unlawful to strike a nonviolent person who had committed no crime, who was not fleeing or resisting arrest, who posed little to no threat to anyone’s safety, and whose only infraction was to call out to a police officer, whom he mistakenly thought was a man attacking a woman”).
Perry v. Woodruff County Sheriff Dept. by and through Barker, 858 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 2017) (stating that “it was clearly established that an assisting officer who knew that a suspect was not resisting or threatening the officers violated that suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights by subduing and handcuffing him”).
Griefenhagan Knight, CIV. 12-1182 DSD/SER, 2013 WL 4050202, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2013) (“In sum, Griefenhagen—although uncooperative with Duzan’s requests to leave the sidewalk—committed, if anything, a relatively minor offense, posed no threat to the safety of the officers or others and was not resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest. As a result, construing the facts in a light most favorable to Griefenhagen, the court determines that a factual dispute exists as to whether Duzan acted reasonably when he grabbed Griefenhagen by the arm, forcefully twisted for over a minute and caused an egg-sized welt.”).
Montoya v. City of Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867, 873 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Assuming once again Montoya’s story is true, the contours of the right at issue were sufficiently clear to inform a reasonable officer in Officer Hooper’s position it was unlawful for him to perform a ‘leg sweep’ and throw to the ground a nonviolent, suspected misdemeanant who was not threatening anyone, was not actively resisting arrest, and was not attempting to flee.”).
Shannon v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 864 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that “the use of force against a suspect who was not threatening and not resisting may be unlawful”).
Garcia v. City of St. Paul, CIV.09-83 (JNE/AJB), 2010 WL 1904917, at *7 (D. Minn. May 10, 2010) (stating that “it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that pursuing a suspected misdemeanant into his home, jumping on his back, and inflicting blows with enough force to break two of his ribs was excessive in light of the limited seriousness of the suspected crime and the absence of an immediate threat to Brown or the public”).
Orsak v. Metro. Airports Commn. Airport Police Dept., 675 F. Supp. 2d 944, 960 (D. Minn. 2009) (“Where, as here, the Graham ‘considerations all weigh in favor of’ the plaintiff, the Eighth Circuit has concluded that it is appropriate to deny summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim.”).
Smith v. Kansas City, Missouri Police Dept., 586 F.3d 576, 582 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that “it was clear to a reasonable officer that knocking a non-resisting suspect to the ground after he had been forcibly removed from his home without cause violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights”).
Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 499 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that “the law was sufficiently clear to inform a reasonable officer that it was unlawful to Taser a nonviolent, suspected misdemeanant who was not fleeing or resisting arrest, who posed little to no threat to anyone’s safety, and whose only noncompliance with the officer’s commands was to disobey two orders to end her phone call to a 911 operator”).
Niznik v. City of Minneapolis, CIV. 05-1169 MJDAJB, 2007 WL 270416, at *7 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2007) (“Niznik has presented evidence demonstrating that he was complying with McCree’s orders when McCree twisted his arm, threw him onto the seat, slammed his head into the concrete, and stood on his neck. Under clearly established law, such force was excessive when applied to a plaintiff who had committed no crime, was not resisting the officer, and posed no visible threat.”).
Kukla v. Hulm, 310 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Here, Kukla alleges that although he did not resist arrest or take an aggressive stance, Hulm forced him against his truck, twisted his arm, and raised it high behind his back injuring his collar bone, shoulder, neck, and wrist. Kukla also claims the handcuffs were so tight that they broke his wrist and were not loosened for fifteen minutes despite his repeated complaints. Considering the circumstances, including the offense at issue, the lack of an immediate safety threat, and the lack of active resistance to arrest, we agree that there is a genuine issue of whether the force used was excessive, so the district court properly denied summary judgment to Hulm.”)