U.S. Supreme Court
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014) (“By weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences contrary to Tolan’s competent evidence, the court below neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.”).
First Circuit
Begin v. Drouin, 908 F.3d 829, 835-36 (1st Cir. 2018) (stating that “a case need not be identical to clearly establish a sufficiently specific benchmark against which one may conclude that the law also rejects the use of deadly force in circumstances posing less of an immediate threat”).
McKenney v. Mangino, 873 F.3d 75, 81-83 (1st Cir. 2017) (stating that “taking the facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the threat presented lacked immediacy and alternatives short of lethal force remained open”).
Second Circuit
Gibbs v. City of Bridgeport, No. 3:16-CV-635 (JAM), 2018 WL 4119588, at *8-11 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2018) (“If Detective Borona knew that Stukes was unarmed and did not have other arguable probable cause to believe that Stukes posed an imminent danger to others, then the use of deadly force on Stukes violated clearly established law, and no objectively reasonable police officer would have resorted to the use of deadly force to kill Stukes as he was running away.”).
Fourth Circuit
Williams v. Strickland, 917 F.3d 763, 770 (4th Cir. 2019) (stating that “officers violate the Fourth Amendment if they employ deadly force against the driver once they are no longer in the car’s trajectory”).
Hensley on behalf of N. Carolina v. Price, 876 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 2017) (“If a jury credited the plaintiffs’ version of the facts, it could reasonably conclude that because Hensley never raised the gun to the officers, and because he never otherwise threatened them, the Deputies shot Hensley simply because he had possession of a firearm. As we held in Cooper, such conduct violates the Fourth Amendment.”).
Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 160 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that “the precedent discussed herein amply demonstrates that the contours of the constitutional right at issue—that is, the right to be free from deadly force when posing no threat—were clearly established at the time the Officers shot Cooper”).
Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 534 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Here, Henry can show under prong one of the qualified immunity analysis that a reasonable officer would have realized he was holding a firearm when shooting. Under prong two, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that shooting a fleeing, nonthreatening misdemeanant with a firearm was unlawful.”)
Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Rather than shoot Brockington as he lay helpless on the ground, a reasonable police officer would have asked him to surrender, called for backup or an ambulance, or retreated, depending on the facts that emerge through discovery.”).
Smith v. Kendall, 369 Fed. Appx. 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Smith was in the SUV with the engine turned off at the time Kendall started shooting at him. He was not resisting arrest or endangering the safety of Kendall or others. If this version of events is accepted, a trier of fact could easily conclude that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred and that a reasonable officer in Kendall’s position could not have believed that he was acting lawfully in employing deadly force.”).
Sixth Circuit
Jacobs v. Alam, 915 F.3d 1028, 1042 (6th Cir. 2019) (“When an officer fires a gun at a person ‘under circumstances which did not justify the use of deadly force’ and when the bullet does not hit the person, the ‘show of authority . . . ha[s] the intended effect of contributing to [the person]’s immediate restraint’ and under our caselaw is a seizure.”).
Lewis v. Charter Twp. of Flint, 660 Fed. Appx. 339, 346-47 (6th Cir. 2016) (“There is longstanding precedent holding that it is unreasonable for an officer to use deadly force against a suspect merely because he is fleeing arrest; rather, such force is only reasonable if the fleeing suspect presents an imminent danger to the officer or others in the vicinity. . . . This is the case even where the suspect flees in a vehicle.”).
Thompson v. City of Lebanon, Tennessee, 831 F.3d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that “a reasonable officer would have been on notice that firing thirteen rounds into Thompson’s vehicle and person violated his Fourth Amendment rights ‘when Thompson had been seen to do nothing more than flee from police during the vehicular pursuit for potential driving under the influence’”).
Hermiz v. City of Southfield, 484 Fed. Appx. 13, 17 (6th Cir. 2012) (“At the time of the incident, Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit case law clearly established the unreasonableness of shooting at the driver of a car that no longer poses a threat.”).
Zulock v. Shures, 441 Fed. Appx. 294, 303 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that “no reasonable police officer could believe that he had the constitutional authority to shoot a man who had offered no threat and who was walking away, toward the back of his kitchen”).
Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2008) (“According to the facts that we must consider at this stage of the proceedings, the officers ran around the corner of the house with their guns drawn, spotted Floyd in the diminished light, and shot him without (1) announcing themselves as police officers, (2) ordering him to surrender, or (3) pausing to determine whether he was actually armed. Based upon the facts as construed in the light most favorable to Floyd, we conclude that his right to be free from such excessive force was clearly established.”).
Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1163 (6th Cir. 1996) (“When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was evidence that Dickerson had simply walked slowly to the front door, with his hands at his side, and that he was shot while still inside his house before he opened his door.”).
Eighth Circuit
Evans v. Krook, 20-cv-2474 (MJD/ECW), at *31 (D. Minn. July 6, 2023) (“The mere fact that Evans was holding a gun to his head was not enough to justify deadly force.”).
Piper Partridge v. City of Benton, 70 F.4th 489, 492 (8th Cir. 2023) (“This court has already held that defendants will be liable if Schweikle ‘never pointed the gun at the officers’ but instead ‘moved his gun in compliance with commands to drop his gun.’ . . . According to this court, it was clearly established at the time that shooting Schweikle under those circumstances would have been a constitutional violation.”).
Marks v. Bauer, CIVIL 20-1913 ADM/JFD, at *21 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2023) (“Here, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer on May 28, 2020, that shooting a high velocity projectile from close range and without warning into the face of an unarmed individual who did not present an immediate threat of death or serious injury amounted to unconstitutional excessive force.”).
Ching v. City of Minneapolis, 0:21-cv-2467 (KMM/DTS), at *17 (D. Minn. Sep. 21, 2022) (“The Court concludes that it was not clearly established that it was unlawful for Officer Walsh to initially use deadly force against Mr. Jordan. However, it was clearly established that after Mr. Jordan had fallen to the ground and dropped the knife, it was unlawful to continue shooting.”).
Williams v. City of Burlington, Iowa, 27 F.4th 1346, 1352 (8th Cir. 2022) (“If, construing the evidence most favorably to the estate, Chiprez knew Jones was unarmed, then shooting him violated a clearly established constitutional right.”).
Banks v. Hawkins, 999 F.3d 521, 529 (8th Cir. 2021) (“Applying the appropriate level of specificity here, we conclude that a reasonable officer had fair warning in February 2017 that he may not use deadly force against a suspect who did not present an imminent threat of death or serious injury, even if the officer felt attacked earlier and even if he believed the suspect had previously posed a threat.”).
Cole Est. of Richards v. Hutchins, 19-1399, 2020 WL 2758694, at *4 (8th Cir. May 28, 2020) (“The law was clearly established in two respects relevant here. First, it was clearly established that a person does not pose an immediate threat of serious physical harm to another when, although the person is in possession of a gun, he does not point it at another or wield it in an otherwise menacing fashion. Second, it was clearly established that a few seconds is enough time to determine an immediate threat has passed, extinguishing a preexisting justification for the use of deadly force.”).
Crowder v. City of Manila, Arkansas, 796 Fed. Appx. 325, 326 (8th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (stating that “it was clearly established that Camp could not use deadly force unless Johnson posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to Camp or others”).
Campbell v. Johannes, 777 Fed. Appx. 847, 848 (8th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (stating that “it was clearly established that Plaintiffs could not be apprehended by deadly force unless they posed a threat of serious physical harm”).
Partridge v. City of Benton, Arkansas, 929 F.3d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Taking the facts in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Keagan’s favor, Ellison shot a non-resisting, non-fleeing minor as he moved his gun in compliance with commands to drop his gun. Under these circumstances, no reasonable officer could conclude Keagan posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm. The law was ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that’ shooting an individual in these circumstances is unlawful.”).
Birkeland as trustee for Birkeland v. Jorgenson, CV 17-1149 (DWF/LIB), 2019 WL 1936736, at *8 (D. Minn. May 1, 2019) (stating that “should a jury determine that Birkeland’s movement did not create an immediate threat to the officers or others, then the use of deadly force would be contrary to clearly established law”).
Henderson as Tr. for Henderson v. City of Woodbury, 909 F.3d 933, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating that if the decedent “fully and unequivocally surrendered to police, lay still, and was shot and killed anyway,” such action would have violated his “clearly established constitutional rights”).
Div. of Empl. Sec., Missouri v. Bd. of Police Commissioners, 864 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 2017) (“In light of Gurley’s compliance with the officers’ demands, it was therefore beyond debate at the time of the events in question that the officers could not reasonably use more than de minimis force against Gurley.”).
Sieff v. Juell, 15-CV-419 (PAM/DTS), 2017 WL 933030, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 2017) (“Sergeant Juell had fair warning at the time of the shooting that the use of deadly force against a fleeing suspect who does not pose a significant and immediate threat of serious injury or death to an officer or others is not permitted.”).
Wallace v. City of Alexander, Arkansas, 843 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that since Tennessee v. Garner, “it has been clearly established ‘that the use of deadly force against a fleeing suspect who does not pose a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others is not permitted,’” and that “such a threat must be ‘immediate’”).
Franklin v. Peterson, CV 14-1467 (DWF/JSM), 2016 WL 6662679, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 10, 2016) (“Eighth Circuit precedent makes clear that officers are ‘on notice that they may not use deadly force unless the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.’”).
Capps v. Olson, 780 F.3d 879, 886 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Based on the facts we are required to assume, Capps did not pose a threat of significant bodily injury or death to Deputy Olson or Scribner. And Deputy Olson had fair and clear warning at the time of the shooting that the use of deadly force against a suspect who did not pose a threat of serious bodily injury or death was unconstitutional.”).
Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The Fourth Amendment prohibits officers from using deadly force to make an arrest ‘unless that individual poses a threat of serious physical harm.’”).
Sorensen v. McLaughlin, CIV. 09-2842 JRT/JJK, 2011 WL 1990143, at *7 (D. Minn. May 23, 2011) (“The right to be free from the use of deadly force, absent an immediate threat to the officer and others, has been clearly established since at least 1985.”).
Moore v. Indehar, 514 F.3d 756, 763 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Since 1985, it has been established by the Supreme Court that the use of deadly force against a fleeing suspect who does not pose a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others is not permitted.”).
Ngo v. Storlie, 495 F.3d 597, 604-05 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A reasonable officer would have known that using deadly force against Ngo, who did not ‘present an immediate threat of serious physical injury or death’ would violate Ngo’s constitutional rights.”).
Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Craighead’s right not to be seized by deadly force was clearly established with sufficient specificity to meet the second prong of Saucier.”).
Wilson v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 293 F.3d 447, 454 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Because of the internal discrepancies and variations in the officers’ testimony, among other things, there remain factual issues in dispute that prohibit a grant of summary judgment. The current record does not conclusively establish the reasonableness of the officers’ actions or beliefs.”).
McCaslin v. Wilkins, 183 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The parties do not dispute that Officer Wilkins intended to fire his weapon at McCaslin, and ‘there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.’”).
Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Considering the totality of the circumstances, we can not escape the conclusion that Anderson and Strong fatally shot Ludwig after St. Paul police suspected him initially of being homeless and emotionally disturbed, and, later, of misdemeanor criminal activity which arguably placed no one in immediate harm.”).
Maras v. City of Brainerd, 502 N.W.2d 69, 77 (Minn. App. 1993) (“As a whole, and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the trustee, Peterson’s actions” – having a knife but never raising it above his waist, being obviously intoxicated, and barely being able to stand – “were relatively benign and did not justify the use of deadly force.”).
Baker v. Chaplin, 497 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. App. 1993), aff’d and remanded, 517 N.W.2d 911 (Minn. 1994) (“We conclude it is abundantly clear that, under the circumstances, the use of deadly force against Baker would be unlawful and violative of the Fourth Amendment. Baker’s behavior was not a threat to the police, the President, or others. She did not try to enter the secured area or cross the police line. She simply moved back pursuant to police instruction and then stood quietly. We conclude that no reasonable, competent police officer could have believed that deadly force was justified in this situation.”).
Yang v. Murphy, 796 F. Supp. 1245, 1251 (D. Minn. 1992) (“It is clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from using deadly force to apprehend a suspect ‘where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others.’”).
Tenth Circuit
Estate of Smart by Smart v. City of Wichita, 951 F.3d 1161, 1176 (10th Cir. 2020) (stating that “a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Chaffee violated Mr. Smart’s right to be free from excessive force by firing the final shots at Mr. Smart after Officer Chaffee had had ‘enough time . . . to recognize and react to’ the fact that Mr. Smart no longer posed a threat (if in fact he ever did pose a threat)”).