Second Circuit
Okin v. Village of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Department, 577 F.3d 415, 434 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that “the state-created danger theory, at the time of defendants’ actions here, clearly established that police officers are prohibited from affirmatively contributing to the vulnerability of a known victim by engaging in conduct, whether explicit or implicit, that encourages intentional violence against the victim”).
Garcia v. Brown, 442 F.Supp.2d 132, 144, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that “no reasonable police officer could have thought that he was privileged to act (or not act) as Officer Brown did — especially a policeman who was aware, as Brown was, that Garcia had been assaulted by the same individuals only moments earlier”).
Small v. City of New York, 274 F. Supp.2d 271, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that “for at least a decade, officials in this Circuit have been on notice that police action which emboldens private citizens to injure others may give rise to a substantive due process violation”).
Brown-Alleyne v. White, 96 CV 2507, 1999 WL 1186809, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1999) (stating that “police officers do have a duty to assist victims whom they have endangered through their own conduct”).
Dwares v. New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that “a prearranged official sanction of privately inflicted injury would surely have violated the victim’s rights under the Due Process Clause”).