Third Circuit
Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Here, the right at issue is an individual’s right not to be sexually fondled and illicitly photographed by a police officer investigating his or her case, for the officer’s own gratification. Thus, based on the above, ‘[t]he ultimate question is whether the state of the law when the offense occurred’ gave Barger ‘fair warning’ that his conduct violated this right. We conclude that it did.”).
Fourth Circuit
Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that claim brought by a plaintiff, who was not arrested or a criminal suspect but was raped by a police officer, was properly viewed as asserting a violation of her substantive due process right to bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than as a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights).
Eighth Circuit
Glover v. Paul, No. 22-2640, at *6 (8th Cir. Aug. 24, 2023) (“A reasonable official would have understood that the conduct alleged in Glover’s verified complaint constituted an unreasonable use of force that violated a detainee’s right under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
S.M. v. Lincoln County, 874 F.3d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 2017) (“It is undisputed that Edwards ‘deprived plaintiffs of a clearly established constitutional right to substantive due process when he committed an egregious, nonconsensual entry into the body which was an exercise of power without any legitimate governmental objective.’”).
Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 239 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that “it was clearly established in this circuit that the commission of a sexual assault by a government official acting under color of law constitutes a violation of due process that shocks the conscience”).
Rogers v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 152 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that “Morgan’s sexual assault violated the clearly established due process right to be free of physical abuse by public officials, and a reasonable officer would have known of this right”).
Haberthur v. City of Raymore, Missouri, 119 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 1997) (“This type of constitutional injury has been described as a violation of the substantive due process right to bodily integrity or privacy, and the courts of appeal have recognized that the right may be violated by sexual fondling and touching or other egregious sexual contact.”).