Second Circuit
Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 208, 209, 211, 212 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that “Russo had a clearly-established constitutional right to be free from prolonged detention caused by law enforcement officials’ mishandling or suppression of exculpatory evidence”).
Eighth Circuit
Hazley v. Roy, 378 F. Supp. 3d 751, 759 (D. Minn. 2019) (“Three circuit courts have found a liberty interest in being free from detention once bail has been set, and no circuit court has held to the contrary.”).
Lockhart-Beilke v. Peterson, CV 13-1208 (JRT/BRT), 2015 WL 5718910, at *7 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2015) (“Under both amendments, Lockhart–Beilke ‘had a clearly established right to be free from wrongful, prolonged incarceration.’”).
Harris v. Hammon, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1038 (D. Minn. 2012) (“The court in Davis concluded that by 2003, when Davis was decided, this constitutional right” – a protected liberty interest in being free from wrongful, prolonged incarceration – “was clearly established not only in the Eighth Circuit but in other circuits as well.”).
Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 388 F.3d 669, 675 (8th Cir. 2004) (“A law enforcement officer cannot reasonably believe that holding a person in jail for 38 days without bringing him before a judicial officer for an initial appearance is constitutional.”).
Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 719 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Based on Slone and the law of other circuits, see supra, we have no difficulty concluding that Davis alleged the deprivation of a clearly established right and that a reasonable government actor would know that failing to respond to Davis’s requests to be released in keeping with the court order that he possessed was unlawful.”).
Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1993) (“There are many Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit cases that support the ‘general, well-developed legal principle’ that regulations which contain ‘particularized substantive standards or criteria that guide the exercise of discretion by penitentiary officials’ create a protectible liberty interest. . . . Moreover, when these regulations contain language of a mandatory nature (shall, will, must), they are interpreted as creating a protectible liberty interest.”).
Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1993) (“We believe that the reasoning of Slone is fully applicable to the unstayed state court judgment at issue here. Any reasonably competent official must know that unless a judgment has been stayed, it must be obeyed.”).
Slone v. Herman, 983 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir. 1993) (“We conclude that when Judge Ely’s order suspending Slone’s sentence became final and nonappealable, the state lost its lawful authority to hold Slone. Therefore, any continued detention unlawfully deprived Slone of his liberty, and a person’s liberty is protected from unlawful state deprivation by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).