First Circuit
Cosenza v. City of Worcester, 355 F. Supp. 3d 81, 96 (D. Mass. 2019) (“While the Court is unaware of any caselaw explicitly holding this type of procedure is unnecessarily suggestive, the First Circuit has held that when an officer’s conduct is so clearly unconstitutional, no precedent directly on point is necessary to provide adequate notice to a reasonable officer.”).
McIntyre v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 2d 87, 125 (D. Mass. 2004) (holding that ” the substantive due process right to not be murdered by a private actor where a government actor aided, abetted, collaborated or conspired with the private actor to accomplish the murder was clearly established”).
Grendell v. Gillway, 974 F. Supp. 46, 52 (D. Me. 1997) (stating that “abhorrent conduct is still abhorrent even though it has not been subject to judicial determination,” and that “Grendell’s right to be free from behavior that is shocking to the conscience was clearly established at the time of Gillway’s alleged conduct”).
Second Circuit
Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged School District, 239 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2001) (“To the extent that no case applying this right in the educational setting has previously arisen in our circuit, we view this unremarkable absence as a strong indication that the right to be free from excessive force is so well-recognized and widely observed by educators in public schools as to have eluded the necessity of judicial pronouncement.”).
Eighth Circuit
Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1130 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that “any reasonable social worker—indeed, any reasonable person, social worker or not—would have known that a sterilization is compelled, not voluntary, if it is consented to under the coercive threat of losing one’s children, and hence unconstitutional”).