fabrication of evidence

First Circuit

Davis v. Murphy, No. 13-CV-11900-IT, 2018 WL 1524532, at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2018) (“While courts have struggled at times to identify the precise cause of action for malicious prosecution, it has long been established that a police officer violates the Constitution by intentionally or recklessly making false statements in, or omitting true exculpatory statements from, materials submitted to a magistrate in support of probable cause.”).

Solomon v. Dookhan, CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-10208-GAO, 21 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2014) (“A fair reading of the Amended Complaint is that Solomon alleges that Keenan joined with Dookhan and others in a scheme to falsify evidence, destroy and withhold exculpatory evidence, obstruct justice and offer false testimony. At no point could a reasonable police officer have believed that such conduct would be permissible.”).

Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 97 n.7 (1st Cir. 2013) (stating that “it cannot be seriously argued that an objectively reasonable officer in Martz and Taylor’s position would have been ignorant of the fact that fabricating evidence was constitutionally unacceptable”).

Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2004) (concluding that it was “self-evident” that “those charged with upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals for crimes they did not commit”).

Second Circuit

Morse v. Fusto, 804 F.3d 538, 550 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that “because there is no plausible legal distinction between misstatements and omissions that we can perceive in this context, we conclude that it was not ‘objectively legally reasonable’ for the defendants in this case to believe that it was permissible for them to knowingly make material omissions in the creation of the billing summaries, thereby knowingly altering evidence during a criminal investigation”).

Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that there was a clearly established constitutional right “not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of evidence by a government officer acting in an investigatory capacity, at least where the officer foresees that he himself will use the evidence with a resulting deprivation of liberty”).

Eighth Circuit

Manning v. Cotton, 862 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2017) (“It is clearly established that ‘the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process is violated by ‘the manufacture of . . . false evidence.’’”).

Flah v. City of Maple Grove, 14-CV-0264 (PJS/FLN), 2015 WL 7303546, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 19, 2015) (“It is ‘clearly established’ that ‘the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process is violated by ‘the manufacture of … false evidence’ in order ‘to falsely formulate a pretense of probable cause.’’”).

Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 351, 354 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Intentionally or recklessly failing to investigate other leads or manufacturing false evidence may shock the conscience and can violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.  . . .  It was clearly established by 2006 that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process is violated by ‘the manufacture of . . . false evidence’ in order ‘to falsely formulate a pretense of probable cause.’”).

Moran v. Clark, 359 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 2004) (“No reasonable official would believe it was permissible to hatch a plan to scapegoat an innocent officer for acts of police brutality against a developmentally disabled citizen.”).

Thompson v. Zimmerman, 350 F.3d 734, 735 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Zimmerman’s and Peninger’s testimony to the contrary, which was undermined by Zimmerman’s admission that the two had submitted false reports concerning the incident, merely created a credibility issue for the fact finder.”).

Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946, 954 (8th Cir. 2001) (“If officers use false evidence, including false testimony, to secure a conviction, the defendant’s due process is violated.”).

Frisby v. Crow, 121 F.3d 712, at *1 (8th Cir. 1997) (“If, as the Frisbys alleged, the evidence tampering resulted in the deprivation of the Frisbys’ property, the officers’ conduct could amount to a violation of the Frisbys’ clearly established due process rights.”).