Second Circuit
Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that “under certain circumstances the disclosure of an inmate’s HIV-positive status and — perhaps more so — her transsexualism could place that inmate in harm’s way”).
Sixth Circuit
McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184, 188 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “according to Bruner, even if one or more of the officers did not actively participate in the beating, they still owed McHenry a duty of protection”).
Eighth Circuit
Reeves v. King, 774 F.3d 430, 432 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that “it was clearly established at that time that labeling an inmate a snitch would unreasonably subject the inmate to a substantial risk of harm from other inmates based on Eighth Circuit case law concluding an inmate who was labeled as a snitch was in danger of assault by other inmates and case law from other circuits holding a correctional officer violates his duty to protect an inmate from harm when he labels the inmate a snitch to other inmates”).
Glaze v. Byrd, 721 F.3d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 2013) (“So if a jury concluded that Childs was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Glaze, and that he failed to notify Andrews, then it could further conclude that Childs was deliberately indifferent to Glaze’s safety. Such deliberate indifference would violate clearly established law that sets forth a jail official’s duty, under certain circumstances, to protect inmates from substantial risks of serious harm.”).
Whitson v. Stone County Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2010) (“An official is deliberately indifferent if he or she actually knows of a substantial risk and fails to respond reasonably.”).
Kachina v. Dingle, CIV.06-5125ADM/JJG, 2008 WL 3582788, at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 12, 2008) (stating that “Defendants do not dispute Judge Graham’s determination that federal case law gave Olson ‘fair warning’ that labeling a prisoner a snitch exposes a prisoner to a serious risk of violence at the hands of other prisoners”).
Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 451 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that “a reasonable prison guard in Brigance’s position would have known that to label Irving a snitch would violate his constitutional right to protection from harm”).
Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that “it was no doubt clearly established long before 2004, when Mr. Young was assaulted, that the eighth amendment required prison officials ‘to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners’”).
Fisher v. State, Dept. of Corrections, A06-76, 2007 WL 1673642, at *3 (Minn. App. June 12, 2007) (“The law is sufficiently clear to put prison officials on notice that they must take reasonable steps to provide for the safety of inmates.”).
Blondheim v. Olmsted County, CIV. 02-385PAMRLE, 2002 WL 31487663, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2002) (“The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”).
Krein v. Norris, 309 F.3d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that “assuming the truth of plaintiff’s substantiated allegations, he has sufficiently alleged a deliberate indifference claim, and defendants’ lack of knowledge that the particular attack would occur does not extinguish the legal existence of his claim”).
White v. Crane, 45 Fed. Appx. 552, 553 (8th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (“Mr. White’s right to be free from the attack was . . . well settled by 2001.”).
Cohrs v. Norris, 210 F.3d 378, at *2 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Although prison guards have no constitutional duty to intervene in an armed assault of one inmate upon another when intervention would place the guards in physical danger or when the inmates outnumber the guards, . . . we believe a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Johnson was deliberately indifferent for failing to seek help from other parts of the prison.”).
Est. of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1395 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating, with regard to force used by a corrections officer on an inmate, that the “law was clearly established at the time of the incident that prison officials may be liable for failure to protect an inmate from a use of excessive force if they are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate”).
Reece v. Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 491 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that the duty of prison officials to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners “requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to abate substantial risks of serious harm, of which the officials are aware”).