First Circuit
Penate v. Kaczmarek, No. CV 3:17-30119-KAR, 2019 WL 319586, at *11 (D. Mass. Jan. 24, 2019) (stating that “it was clearly established in 2013 that a forensic chemist had Brady disclosure obligations and the information about Farak’s conduct was material to Plaintiff’s trial”).
Johnson v. Han, No. CV 14-CV-13274-IT, 2015 WL 4397360, at *6-8 (D. Mass. July 17, 2015) (stating that “a reasonable state-employed chemist would have known in 2009 that she had a duty not to withhold exculpatory test results and that she could not knowingly present fabricated evidence of guilt in support of a criminal defendant’s conviction,” and that “no reasonable supervisor could fail to grasp that liability would attach for exhibiting deliberate indifference towards the falsification and withholding of evidence by her subordinates”).
Jones v. Han, 993 F.Supp.2d 57, 65-67 (D. Mass. 2014) (stating that “defendants were on reasonable notice that the information they knew about Dookhan should have been disclosed”).
Drumgold v. Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 43 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2013) (stating that “the law was firmly settled at the time of Drumgold’s criminal trial that a law enforcement officer may not deliberately suppress material evidence that is favorable to a defendant”).
Toro v. Murphy, No. 07-11721-PBS, 2009 WL 5064575, at *6, *7 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2009) (“The Agurs standard was sufficiently specific to ‘clearly establish’ the right to exculpatory evidence regarding alternative suspects.”).
Charles v. City of Boston, 365 F.Supp.2d 82, 89 (D. Mass. 2005) (“Bogdan, an experienced crime lab technician, must have known of his legal obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the prosecutors, their obligation to pass it along to the defense, and his obligation not to cover up a Brady violation by perjuring himself. . . . Some acts are unlawful on their face.”).
Second Circuit
Poventud v. City of New York, No. 07 CIV. 3998 DAB, 2015 WL 1062186, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2015) (“That Defendant Umlauft had to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence to the prosecutor, and that disclosure by the prosecutor to the defense was required in time for it to be effectively used at trial was clearly established.”).
Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In the present case, given the jury’s findings that Agostini misrepresented the evidence to the prosecutors, or failed to pass on material information, or made statements that were false, and engaged in such misconduct knowingly, and given the ample evidentiary support for those findings, the district court correctly concluded that no reasonable officer could have believed Agostini’s actions to be lawful.”).
Warney v. City of Rochester, 536 F.Supp. 285, 295, 296 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that “no reasonable prosecutor in 2005 or early 2006 could have believed that it was constitutionally permissible to withhold or conceal evidence from a convicted citizen, which had substantial power to exonerate him”).