First Circuit
Elliott v. Cheshire Cty., 940 F.2d 7, 11 n.3 (1st Cir. 1991) (“Qualified immunity should be denied if the officials were or should have been aware that the prisoner presented a substantial risk of suicide.”).
Second Circuit
Randle v. Alexander, 170 F. Supp. 3d 580, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (considering and rejecting qualified immunity in the Eighth Amendment context where officials ignored a prisoner’s history of suicidal tendencies).
Sinkov v. Americor, Inc., 419 F. App’x 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming jury verdict where “evidence was sufficient ‘to support a conclusion by a reasonable juror'” that company that had contracted with a county “to provide medical care to detainees” was “‘actually aware’ of [detainee’s] risk of suicide and was deliberately indifferent to that risk”).
Kelsey v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 5978 (JFB) (KAM), 2006 WL 3725543, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2006), aff’d, 306 F. App’x 700 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that “a pretrial detainee’s right to be free from deliberate indifference by police officers to suicide, while in custody, is a clearly established right”).
Seventh Circuit
Estate of Clark v. Walker, No. 16-3560, 2017 WL 3165632, at *6 (7th Cir. July 26, 2017) (stating that the right to treatment of a serious medical need, including risk of suicide, is clearly established).
Eighth Circuit
Lynas v. Stang, 18-2301 (JRT-KMM), 2020 WL 4816375, at *15 (D. Minn. Aug. 19, 2020) (stating that “a reasonable jury could find that Sherburne County Jail had policies or customs which resulted in deliberate indifference to the safety of suicidal inmates,” “a reasonable jury could find that Robertson refused to provide essential care by scheduling Lynas’s appointment so far out as to be useless,” and “a reasonable jury could find that MEnD had policies or customs which resulted in deliberate indifference to the safety of suicidal inmates”).
Brenner v. Asfeld, 18-CV-2383 (NEB/ECW), 2019 WL 2358451, at *5 (D. Minn. June 4, 2019) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits officials from acting with deliberate indifference towards the risk of suicide, and the Fourteenth Amendment extends this protection to pre-trial detainees.”).
Bechtold v. Stearns County, Mn., CIV. 05-2701JRTRLE, 2007 WL 2892568, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2007) (“It is clearly established in the Eighth Circuit that a prison official may be liable under the Eighth Amendment where the official ‘knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’ . . . More specifically, the Eighth Circuit has imposed liability on prison officials whose inadequate training procedures or failure to supervise resulted in the suicide of an inmate.”).
Wever v. Lincoln County, Nebraska, 388 F.3d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 2004) (“As a pretrial detainee, Wever had a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to be protected from the known risks of suicide.”) (footnote omitted).
Turney v. Waterbury, 375 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that “Waterbury’s response to Turney’s known suicide risk, which included not investigating the earlier attempt, not permitting Merchen to complete Turney’s intake form, placing Turney in a cell alone with a bed sheet and exposed ceiling bars, and ordering Merchen not to enter Turney’s cell without backup – yet leaving her as the only official at the jail – are facts which exhibit deliberate indifference”).
Coleman v. Parkman, 349 F.3d 534, 540 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that if defendants “knew Coleman was suicidal, their actions were unreasonable”).
Olson v. Bloomberg, 339 F.3d 730, 738 (8th Cir. 2003) (“In this case, if Hauglin knew that there was a substantial risk of serious harm to Gacek because of Gacek’s direct communication to Hauglin of his present intent to commit suicide and his chosen method; and if Hauglin deliberately disregarded the risk of Gacek committing suicide by encouraging him to do so, leaving the catwalk, and refusing to return when other inmates tried to inform him of Gacek’s hanging, then his conduct would rise to an Eighth amendment actionable level.”).
Ninth Circuit
Campos v. Cty. of Kern, No. 14 Civ. 1099 (DAD) (JLT), 2017 WL 915294, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017) (stating that “the law regarding the Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care,” including the right “to be protected from the known risks of suicide in jail,” was “clearly established”).
Conn v. City of Reno, 572 F.3d 1047, 1063 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Had the[] [officers] been trained in suicide prevention, there is a reasonable probability that they would have responded differently and reported to the jail that [arrestee] was at risk of suicide, or taken her directly to the hospital.”).