Eighth Circuit
Irish v. McNamara, Civil 23-619 ADM/ECW, at *15 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2023) (“Given this clear precedent, a reasonable officer in McNamara’s shoes would have understood that deploying the canine off leash to find and bite the suspect without giving an audible warning violated clearly established law.”).
Adams v. City of Cedar Rapids, 74 F.4th 935, 940 (8th Cir. 2023) (“Officer Trimble had fair notice from this court’s precedent that the failure to give a warning and an opportunity to surrender violated clearly established law. He is not entitled to qualified immunity.”).
Collins v. Schmidt, 326 F. Supp. 3d 733, 744-45 (D. Minn. 2018) (“Regarding Schmidt’s failure to warn, even though Kuha does not explicitly spell out the obvious point that the required warning must be audible, it does establish that the warning must be ‘loud.’ . . . And it is clearly established in this district that a plaintiff’s failure to hear a warning creates a triable issue of fact as to whether the officer properly gave one. . . . While there is no evidence that Schmidt knowingly violated the law, there is no question that he should have known better. As such, Schmidt is not entitled to qualified immunity.”).
Grady v. Becker, 907 F. Supp. 2d 975, 980 (D. Minn. 2012) (stating that “the general rule is that absent a threat to his safety, a police officer must warn a suspect before releasing a dog upon him”).
Krawiecki v. Hawley, 08-CV-5309 JMR/RLE, 2010 WL 3269960, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2010) (stating that “a reasonable officer would have known it was unlawful to unleash a dog upon a nonviolent and stationary suspected misdemeanant”).
Kruse v. Jackson, 05-CV-2123 JMR/FLN, 2006 WL 3758204, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2006) (stating that “it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the release of a bite-and-hold trained canine without a prior warning to the suspect would violate the suspect’s constitutional rights”).
Spencer v. City of Minneapolis, CIV036186(DWF/JSM), 2005 WL 578316, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 2005) (“Defendants assert that Officer Blad acted reasonably in using Max to effect the arrest of Plaintiff, who was wanted on a felony warrant and was, according to Officer Blad’s accounts, attempting to elude arrest. Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that Officer Blad sicced Max on Plaintiff without provocation and as Plaintiff was attempting to comply with Officer Blad’s directives. If a jury were to believe Plaintiff’s versions of the facts, that jury could find that Officer Blad’s release of the dog was not objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting Officer Blad, and that Officer Blad had used excessive force.”).
Ninth Circuit
Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We agree that it was clearly established that excessive duration of the bite and improper encouragement of a continuation of the attack by officers could constitute excessive force that would be a constitutional violation.”).
Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (May 31, 1994) (stating that “no particularized case law is necessary for a deputy to know that excessive force has been used when a deputy sics a canine on a handcuffed arrestee who has fully surrendered and is completely under control”).
Tenth Circuit
Savannah v. Knab, Civil Action No. 12-cv-02403-RBJ-MJW, 12 (D. Colo. Jun. 11, 2015) (stating that “the idea that one cannot apply unneeded force to a suspect who is already effectively subdued and compliant is well-established to the point of being obvious”).
Eleventh Circuit
Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2000) (“On Plaintiff’s version of the facts, which we must accept, Defendant Wheeler ordered and allowed his dog to attack and bite Plaintiff; threatened to kill Plaintiff when Plaintiff kicked the dog in an effort to resist the unprovoked attack; and let the dog attack Plaintiff for at least two minutes. Considering these facts, no particularized preexisting case law was necessary for it to be clearly established that what Defendant Wheeler did violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from the excessive use of force.”).