First Circuit
Aceto v. Kachajian, 240 F. Supp.2d 121, 126-27 (D. Mass. 2003) (stating that “it was clearly established under published caselaw that when a non-threatening, non-flight-risk, cooperating arrestee for a minor crime tells the police she suffers from an injury that would be exacerbated by handcuffing her arms behind her back, the arrestee has a right to be handcuffed with her arms in front of her even if the injury is not visible”).
Third Circuit
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that “the right of an arrestee to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of his handcuffing clearly was established when Officer Tate acted in this case, and . . . a reasonable officer would have known that employing excessive force in the course of handcuffing would violate the Fourth Amendment”).
Fourth Circuit
Turmon v. Jordan, 405 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that “it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that he could not point his gun at an individual’s face, jerk him from his room, and handcuff him when there was no reasonable suspicion that any crime had been committed, no indication that the individual posed a threat to the officer, and no indication that the individual was attempting to resist or evade detention”).
Fifth Circuit
Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 169 (5th Cir. 2009) (involving “handcuffs applied so tightly that they caused severe nerve damage”).
Sixth Circuit
Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 613 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating that “unduly tight or excessively forceful handcuffing is a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
Morrison v. Bd. Of Trustees Of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The Fourth Amendment prohibits unduly tight or excessively forceful handcuffing during the course of a seizure.”).
Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th Cir. 1993) (“An excessive use of force claim could be premised on Officer Birberick’s handcuffing Walton if he knew that she had an injured arm and if he believed that she posed no threat to him.”).
Eighth Circuit
Mhanna v. Metro. Council, 21-cv-1974 (ECT/DTS), at *2 (D. Minn. May 1, 2023) (“The unconstitutionality of leaving Johnson handcuffed during this time was clearly established before the stop.”).
Ivey v. Williams, CV 12-30 (DWF/TNL), 2019 WL 669805, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2019) (“The Court finds that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that subsequent use of a rear wrist lock, hinged handcuffs, and ‘chicken wing’ positioning was unnecessary and excessive, considering Plaintiff was already subdued and restrained when Defendants entered his room.”).
Kukla v. Hulm, 310 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Here, Kukla alleges that although he did not resist arrest or take an aggressive stance, Hulm forced him against his truck, twisted his arm, and raised it high behind his back injuring his collar bone, shoulder, neck, and wrist. Kukla also claims the handcuffs were so tight that they broke his wrist and were not loosened for fifteen minutes despite his repeated complaints. Considering the circumstances, including the offense at issue, the lack of an immediate safety threat, and the lack of active resistance to arrest, we agree that there is a genuine issue of whether the force used was excessive, so the district court properly denied summary judgment to Hulm.”).
Eason v. Anoka-Hennepin E. Metro Narcotics & Violent Crimes Task Force, CIV.00-311 PAM/SRN, 2002 WL 1303023, at *7 (D. Minn. June 6, 2002) (“Because there is a general consensus among courts that police officers must factor a suspect’s alleged preexisting injury into this calculus, at least when there is an objective manifestation of that injury, and make some effort to accommodate the injury, provided the circumstances permit such an accommodation, the Court finds that the Fourth Amendment right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident.”).
Bahr v. County of Martin, 771 F. Supp. 970, 976 (D. Minn. 1991) (“Nothing in the record indicates that the force that the deputies used to arrest, handcuff and transport Bahr to the Martin County jail was ‘objectively reasonable.’”).