First Circuit
Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 406 F.3d 43, 55 (1st Cir. 2005) (“O’Neill is not entitled to qualified immunity because the law was clearly established in 1998 that an officer in O’Neill’s circumstances had a duty to intervene.”).
Sixth Circuit
Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 329 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Officers Collins and Hughes had a clearly-established duty to protect Mr. Nall dating back to at least 1997, and the facts indicate that both failed in this duty, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to both officers on this claim.”).
Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 1982) (“The foregoing authority clearly counsels that it is not necessary, in order to hold a police officer liable under § 1983, to demonstrate that the officer actively participated in striking a plaintiff.”).
Seventh Circuit
Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that an officer may be held liable for failing to intervene to stop another officer’s use of excessive force during the investigation of a crime scene).
Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972) (“We believe it is clear that one who is given the badge of authority of a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and fail to stop other officers who summarily punish a third person in his presence or otherwise within his knowledge.”).
Eighth Circuit
Molina v. City of St. Louis, No. 21-1830, at *13 (8th Cir. Feb. 2, 2023) (“To be sure, Groce could not see who launched the tear-gas canister. But with multiple ‘officers present,’ the jury could find that each one of them participated in the decision or that one did it ‘while the other[s] failed to intervene.’ Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007). Under these circumstances, the claims against the individual officers can proceed.”).
Thomas v. Barze, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1074-75 (D. Minn. 2014) (stating that “a reasonable officer should have known to *1075 intervene and stop another officer from putting a student in a neck restraint or choke hold where such restraint was unprovoked”).
Gary v. Christopherson, CIV. 11-2699 DSD/JJG, 2013 WL 2318017, at *4 n.7 (D. Minn. May 28, 2013) (“An officer may be liable for failing to intervene when another officer uses excessive force.”).
Willenbring v. City of Breezy Point, CIV. 08-4760, 2010 WL 3724361, at *6 (D. Minn. Sept. 16, 2010) (stating that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer under these circumstances that it was necessary to intervene and prevent Garcia’s further use of the taser”).
Maeberry v. City of St. Paul, Minn., CIV 09-1216, 2010 WL 2814285, at *6 (D. Minn. July 16, 2010) (“At the time of the individual officers’ actions in this case, ‘it was clearly established that a state actor may be liable for an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment if he fails to intervene to prevent the unconstitutional use of excessive force by another official.’”).
Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 612 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that “it was clearly established that an officer who fails to intervene to prevent the unconstitutional use of excessive force by another officer may be held liable for violating the Fourth Amendment”).
Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 565 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that “it was clearly established that a state actor may be liable for an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment if he fails to intervene to prevent the unconstitutional use of excessive force by another official”).
Michaud v. Demarest, CIV 06-4362 ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 4057744, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2008) (“The right to be free from excessive force and the duty imposed on law enforcement officers to intervene to prevent the violation of that right by their fellow officers were clearly established at the time of the incident at the LEC.”).
Stockton v. Auren, CIV. 07-556 JRT/FLN, 2008 WL 1994992, at *7 (D. Minn. May 5, 2008) (stating that “under these circumstances, a reasonable officer would have known it is unlawful to execute a forceful arm-bar takedown, and unlawful to fail to intervene to prevent such conduct”).
Buckner v. Hollins, 983 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1993) (“The district court stated, as a conclusion of law, that “it was simply not reasonable for Veltrop to conclude that it would be proper to stand by and watch a cuffed and naked inmate be beaten on FRDC premises.” We agree and affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.”).
Tenth Circuit
Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that an officer had an affirmative duty to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force by another officer during an investigatory stop).
Eleventh Circuit
Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2000) (“No particularized case law was necessary for a reasonable police officer to know that, on the facts of this case and given that the duty to intervene was clearly established, he should have intervened.”).