Second Circuit
Greenaway v. Cty. of Nassau, 97 F. Supp. 3d 225, 240-41 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that “tasing a non-violent mentally ill person engaged in non-criminal conduct violated a federal right that was clearly established”).
Garcia v. Dutchess Cnty., 43 F. Supp. 3d 281, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The fact that many of these decisions involve the use of tasers in dart rather than stun mode is not a dispositive difference, given that both methods of deploying a taser constitute ‘significant’ force in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”).
Fourth Circuit
Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877, 888 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Yates, no reasonable officer would have believed that Terry’s use of the taser was justifiable at all and certainly not on three occasions.”).
Meyers v. Baltimore County, Md., 713 F.3d 723, 735 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that “because Ryan did not pose a threat to the officers’ safety and was not actively resisting arrest, a reasonable officer in Officer Mee’s position would have understood that his delivery of some, if not all, of the seven additional taser shocks violated Ryan’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force”).
Sixth Circuit
Brown v. Chapman, 15-3506, 2016 WL 683260 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016) (stating that “it was clearly established that tasering a non-threatening suspect who was not actively resisting arrest constituted excessive force”).
Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384, 397 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that “Kent—a man who yelled at officers and refused to comply with commands to calm down, but was never told that he was under arrest, never demonstrated physical violence, and had his arms in the air and his back to the wall when tased—had a right to be free from the use of a taser under these circumstances”).
White v. City of Southfield, 14-CV-10557, 2015 WL 5545472, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2015) (stating that “a reasonable jury could find that Louden used excessive force because he tased White at time when White was not resisting or was no longer resisting”).
Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 328 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Because Mr. Nall had a clearly established constitutional right not to be tasered when he was at most offering passive resistance to an officer, and because he also had a clearly established constitutional right not to be gratuitously tasered after ceasing all resistance to the officers, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment with respect to Mr. Nall’s excessive force claim against Officer Soto.”).
Baker v. Union Twp., 587 Fed. Appx. 229, 235-36 (6th Cir. 2014) (“By the time of Baker’s tasing, case law had clearly established that police may not tase a non-threatening suspect.”).
Brown v. Weber, 555 Fed. Appx. 550, 555 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Brown alleged facts sufficient to show that Weber discharged a taser three times within sixteen seconds on Brown, who was noncompliant but not actively resisting arrest. Under this account, cabined by the incontrovertible facts shown by the video, Weber’s use of the taser amounted to force that was excessive under clearly established law in December 2010.”).
Eldridge v. City of Warren, 533 Fed. Appx. 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2013) (“We further note that the two officers’ actions violated a clearly-established right: the right of a suspect to be free from the use of physical force when he is not resisting police efforts to apprehend him.”).
Correa v. Simone, 528 Fed. Appx. 531, 535–36 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Using a taser on a potentially armed suspect who is complying with all officer commands and not resisting violated clearly established law as of May 2010.”).
Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir.2012) (stating that for qualified immunity purposes, “[a] suspect’s active resistance . . . marks the line between reasonable and unreasonable tasing”).
Thomas v. Plummer, 489 Fed. Appx. 116, 127 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Here, Thomas surrendered, putting herself at the officers’ mercy by falling to her knees and placing her hands above her head. Every reasonable officer would have understood that tasing a suspect in such a position was excessive in August 2009.”).
Kijowski v. City of Niles, 372 F. App’x 595, 601 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Against the backdrop of existing law, Officer Aurilio could not reasonably have believed that use of a Taser on a non-resistant subject was lawful.”).
Landis v. Baker, 297 Fed. Appx. 453, 464 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The defendant officers should have known that the use of a taser in stun mode, in rapid succession on a suspect who is surrounded by officers, in a prone position in a muddy swamp, who has only one arm beneath him, and who has just been struck several times with a baton would be a violation of a constitutional right.”).
Eighth Circuit
Masters v. City of Independence, 998 F.3d 827, 837 (8th Cir. 2021) (“In September 2014, it was clearly established that prolonging the use of a Taser against a suspect who was complying with a police officer’s commands constituted an excessive use of force.”).
Johnson v. McCarver, 942 F.3d 405, 412 (8th Cir. 2019) (“At the time of the incident, it was clearly established that it was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to apply a taser to a ‘nonviolent, suspected misdemeanant who was not fleeing or resisting arrest, [and] who posed little to no threat to anyone’s safety.’”).
Thompson v. Monticello, Arkansas, City of, 894 F.3d 993, 1000 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating that “it was clearly established that intentionally tasering, without warning, an individual who has been stopped for a nonviolent misdemeanor offense and who is not resisting or fleeing arrest while his hands are visible violates that individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force”).
Brossart v. Janke, 859 F.3d 616, 625 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Our prior cases have clearly established that ‘use of [a] taser on a nonfleeing, nonviolent suspected misdemeanant [is] unreasonable.’”).
Lollie v. Johnson, 159 F. Supp. 3d 945, 961 (D. Minn. 2016) (stating that “whether the force [the officers] used to effectuate [the] arrest was excessive” was a question of fact “for a jury to decide”).
Van Raden v. Larsen, CIV. 13-2283 DWF/LIB, 2015 WL 853592, at *7 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2015) (“The Eighth Circuit has determined that ‘non-violent, non-fleeing subjects have a clearly established right to be free from the use of tasers.’”).
Smith v. Conway County, Ark., 759 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2014) (“At a minimum, with regard to Zulpo’s second taser strike, the district court correctly found, inferring Smith was a nonviolent inmate, Smith’s constitutional right to be free from being tased for non-compliance was clearly established by Hickey as of the date of the incident.”).
Procknow v. Curry, 26 F. Supp. 3d 875, 888 (D. Minn. 2014) (“If Procknow was indeed complying with Ondrey’s commands and had surrendered himself for handcuffing, then Ondrey’s use of a Taser would be unreasonable as a matter of law.”).
B.J.R. ex rel. Garcia v. Golgart, CIV. 11-1105 JRT/SER, 2013 WL 3455598, at *8 (D. Minn. July 9, 2013) (stating that according to B.J.R., “while both officers pinned her to the ground, she yelled that her arm was trapped underneath her body and she could not free it with them on top of her. A reasonable officer would have understood that it is unlawful to tase B.J.R. for failing to put her hand behind her back in this situation.”).
Haggins v. Sherburne County, CIV. 10-2554 DWF/LIB, 2012 WL 4372545, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2012) (“Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Haggins, his behavior, though uncooperative, was not threatening, and thus Pedersen’s Taser use was objectively unreasonable and violated Haggins’s due process rights.”).
Shekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 367 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that “the general constitutional principles against excessive force that were clearly established at the time of the incident between Deputy Eichenberger and Shekleton were such as to put a reasonable officer on notice that tasering Shekleton under the circumstances as presented by Shekleton was excessive force in violation of the clearly established law”).
Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 499 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that “the law was sufficiently clear to inform a reasonable officer that it was unlawful to Taser a nonviolent, suspected misdemeanant who was not fleeing or resisting arrest, who posed little to no threat to anyone’s safety, and whose only noncompliance with the officer’s commands was to disobey two orders to end her phone call to a 911 operator”).
Mahamed v. Anderson, CIV.07-4815ADM/FLN, 2009 WL 873534, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2009) (“Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mahamed, he was uncooperative but not dangerous or threatening, and therefore the use of a taser violated his clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive force.”).
Bady v. Murphy-Kjos, CIV. 06-2254 JRT/FLN, 2008 WL 3262778, at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2008) (“Taking the facts in a light most favorable to Bady as the Court must, the officers in this case jumped, kneed, and punched a nonresistant suspect who was experiencing a medical emergency, could not breathe, and appeared weak and disoriented. Two officers then tased the non-resistant suspect four times, despite the fact that Bady was handcuffed and lying face down on the ground. The Court finds that a reasonable officer would be on notice that the use of such force on a non-resistant suspect would violate the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.”).
Bailey v. County of Kittson, CIV 07-1939 ADM/RLE, 2008 WL 906349, at *16 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2008) (“There is little evidence in the record regarding the reasonableness of using a taser in the situation the officers confronted.”).
Ninth Circuit
Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The right to be free from the application of non-trivial force for engaging in mere passive resistance was clearly established prior to 2008.”).
Tenth Circuit
Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007) (“On the summary judgment record — which of course may be disputed at trial — Officer Lor’s use of the Taser was without any legitimate justification in light of Graham. We do not know of any circuit that has upheld the use of a Taser immediately and without warning against a misdemeanant like Mr. Casey.”).
Eleventh Circuit
Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 908 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Tasering the plaintiff at least eight and as many as eleven or twelve times over a two-minute span without attempting to arrest or otherwise subdue the plaintiff—including tasering Oliver while he was writhing in pain on the hot pavement and after he had gone limp and immobilized—was so plainly unnecessary and disproportionate that no reasonable officer could have thought that this amount of force was legal under the circumstances.”).