Third Circuit
Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 497 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that post-handcuffing application of mace and kneeling on the back of a 14-year-old was clearly unconstitutional under Graham factors).
Eighth Circuit
Johnson v. Carroll, 658 F.3d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 2011) (“At the time of this incident, the law was sufficiently clear to inform a reasonable officer that it was unlawful to throw to the ground and mace a nonviolent, suspected misdemeanant who was not fleeing or herself resisting arrest, who posed little or no threat to anyone’s safety, who never received verbal commands to remove herself, and whose only action was to engage in a protective maneuver.”).
Thompson v. City of Minneapolis, 06-CV-3131(JMR/FLN), 2008 WL 11458593, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr. 22, 2008) (“If Thompson was merely moving away from an arrest scene, having made a single comment to the arresting officer, a use of force and a step up the force continuum would have been unreasonable. A reasonable officer in Reimer’s position would have understood that grabbing Thompson, spinning him around, forcing him to the ground, and macing both Thompson and Merrick crossed a constitutional line.”).
Rahn v. Hawkins, 73 Fed. Appx. 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (stating that “the law was clearly established that using deadly force against a suspect who was attempting to surrender, and macing an unconscious suspect, exceeded the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness standard”).
Cornelious v. Brubaker, 01CV1254(MGD/JGL), 2003 WL 21511125, at *11 (D. Minn. June 25, 2003) (stating that “an officer faced with an offender across the street would be unwarranted in approaching the offender with a spray can of mace before making other attempts for him to submit to the arrest,” and that ”a reasonable officer would recognize that he was violating the rights of a detained person by spraying him with mace and beating him while he was restrained by handcuffs in the back of a squad car”).