force absent particularized suspicion

Eighth Circuit

Heard v. City of Red Wing, 393 F. Supp. 3d 785, 791 (D. Minn. 2019) (stating that “it was clearly established in 2017 that “it would be unreasonable to use any amount of force to seize a person” the officers had no particularized suspicion to stop or detain”).

Trang Nguyen v. Lokke, 11-CV-3225 PJS/SER, 2013 WL 4747459, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 2013) (stating that “a reasonable officer would know that, in a situation in which any seizure is unreasonable, the use of any force to effect a seizure would likewise be unreasonable,” and that “the law was crystal clear that an officer does not have the right to effect any seizure of a citizen—and thus does not have the right to use any force against a citizen—except when there is probable cause to believe that the citizen has committed a crime (or in the narrow circumstances when probable cause is not required)”).

Smith v. Appledorn, CIV. 11-2966 JNE/SER, 2013 WL 451320, at *4-5 (D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2013) (stating that in a case where “force was used in the course of an unreasonable seizure,” “no use of force would have been reasonable,” and that a reasonable officer “would have known that it would be unreasonable to use any amount of force to seize a person in the position—injured, complying, and not fighting—that Smith maintains that he was in”).

Hemphill v. Hale, 677 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Because no use of force to obtain Hemphill’s consent to search would have been reasonable, the force Hale was alleged to have used—grabbing Hemphill by the neck, choking him, and hitting him two or three times while he was handcuffed—was objectively unreasonable given the facts and circumstances in the case.”).